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Taxation, coercion and donors
Local government tax enforcement in Tanzania
Abstract:
This paper presents three propositions about tax collection in local authorities in Tanzania.
First, revenue performanee depends on the degree of coercion involved in tax enforcement.
Second, the extent of coercion depends on the bargaining powers of the stakeholders involved
in the tax enforcement process. Inparticular, the 'balance of power' between elected
councillors and the local government administration is important. Third, the presence of
donors ' in a local authority may be crucial by changing the 'balanee of power' with
implications for accountability and democratie development. These results may explain why
we observe widespread dtfferences in revenue performanee between local authorities.
1. Introduction 1
In recent years there has been an increasing focus on the possible linkages between high
levels of development aid and taxation in Afrca. Without aid, governents would have to cut
spending, raise taxes, or borrow from other sources. Thus, it is argued, high levels of aid may
diminish a governents incentive to make full use of its domestic resources for revenue
generation (Brautigam and Botchwey, 1999; Moore, 1998).2
Some development agencies have responded to the critique levelled against them by
introducing various incentive schemes to reduce the assumed free riding problems by
recipient governents, and thereby increasing domestie tax effort. Thus, in mary aid
dependent Afrcar countres revenue targets have become a major component of the aid
conditionality.3 For instance, the International Monetar Fund argues that Afrcan countries
'have significant potential for raising tax receipts by broadening the tax base, improving tax
administration, and rationalising the tax system' (Hadjimichael et aL., 1995:44). Furthermore,
some donors' involved in district deve10pment programes, have adopted matching schemes,
i This paper is based on research caried out in collaboration with Joseph Semboja whom I would like to thank
for comments and advice. Thanks also to Hildegunn Nordås, Lise Rakner, Lars Sørgard, Ole Therkildsen and
Bertil Tungodden for constnictive comments. Points ofview and possible errors are entirely my responsibility.
Financial support from the Research Council ofNolWay and the Collaborative Agreement between CMI and the
School of Governent, University ofWestem Cape, is gratefullyacknowledged.2 The empirical evidence is, however, inconclusive on the actual impacts of aid on domestic revenue raising
effort (White, 1994; Devarajan et aL., 1998).
3 In 1997, aid represented 10 per cent or more ofGDP in 21 African countries (World Bank, 1999).
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which supplies aid only on the basis of matching funds from the local governent (Catterson
and Lindahl, 1998).
The rationale behind this policy is based on the perception that the current tax effort in most
Afrcan countries is low.4 Some observers, however, question the premise behind this policy.
Collier (1997:56), for instance, c1aims that tax levels in Afrca are already high. Re argues
that high taxation retards the growth process and induces tax evasion. Thus, the build-up of
the taxable base of the economy is delayed, and so is the time at which fiscal sustainability
can be achieved. Accordingly, increasing tax effort would be "both ludicrous and self-
defeating" (ibid, p. 54).
Recently, Moore (1998) has introduced a new element into the debate on taxation and aid.
Moore focuses on the anti-democratic effects of aid dependency. Re argues that by the means
donors use to promote development in the poorest countres, they are undermining the values
of democracy and good governance that they are otherwise trying to promote through
'general' political conditionality and specific aid interventions. 5 Moore's point of departre is
the acknowledgement that bargaining over the budget and over tax policy is one of the
primary ways in which different state and societal goals are reconciled in a democracy. For
instance, in Europe over the past two centuries, taxation and disputes over the use of revenues
stimulated the development of greater citizen rights and privileges, with democratic
institutions enforcing accountability and greater transparency in expenditures (Tily, 1992).
Moore's key proposition is that the more a state 'earns' its income through the operation of a
bureaucratic apparatus for tax collection, the state needs to enter into reciprocal arrangements
with citizens about provision of services and representation in exchange for tax
contrbutions.6 Thus, the larger share 'eamed' incornes represent of total revenues the more
likely it is that state-society relations are characterised by accountability, responsiveness and
democracy. In many cases, however, aid dependency may thwar these processes in Afrca.
4 For instace, Heller (1997:39) calls the tax effort in most African countries 'disappointingly low'.
5 Democracy in this context is understood as a sub-species of a broader concept: the accountability of state to
society (Therkildsen, 2000). This political accountability is about those with authority being answerable for their
actions to the citizens, whether directly or indirectly. Day and Klein (1987:26-27) make an important distinction
between political and managerial accountabilty, the latter being about makng those with delegated authority
answerable for caring out agreed tasks according to agreed criteria of performance.
6 Moore (1998:94) argues that the use of the concept 'eared is a 10gical extension from the term 'rentier' , since
rentier is 'uneamed in the language of c1assical political economy.
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Afrcan states have significant 'uneamed incomes in the form of foreign aid (Goldsmith,
2000: 18). Aid alone now accounts for almost half the income of many governents of low-
income countres. Therefore, many Afrcan governents seem currently to face more
organised and effective pressures for accountability and transparency from the international
donor agencies than from their own citizens and parliaments (Brautigam and Botchwey,
1999).
The purpose of this paper is to explore the possible linkages between taxation and
accountability in a poor aid dependent countr. In particular, does the social contract
argument that Moore us es appropriately specify the political and administrative problems of a
poor country? Furthermore, who are the likely stakeholders involved in the domestic tax
enforcement process, and how does the presence of donors influence their relative bargaining
power? What impact wil such presence have on domestic revenue generation? Local
authorities interact more closely with the citizens than other organs of the state apparatus, and
hence provide a good case for exploring these questions at a disaggregate leveL.
The paper draws on findings from research carred out in local authorities in Tanzania during
the late 1990s. Thefieldstudies were conducted in Kibaha Distrct Council, Coastal Region,
and Kilosa DC, Morogoro Region. The studies covered all three council levels; the distrct
headquarters, the wards and the vilage leveIs. In addition, data on tax revenues for about 50
councils were collected from the Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Governent.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents briefly the empirical background for the
analysis. In section 3 we discuss why different levels of revenue raising effort may be
observed in local authorities, which have very similar socio-economic characteristics. Section
4 examines the institutional set-up for taxcollection, emphasising the roles of tax collectors
and elected councilors in the tax enforcement process. Thereafter, in section 5, possible
impacts of donors are explored. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2. The cases
Total tax revenues per capita reveal substantial differences between councils. In 1995, in a
sample of 20 councils, reported revenues per person above the age of 18 ranged from TSh 344
in Lindi DC, to TSh L ,527 in Njombe DC. Some of these differences may be explained by
different economic structures, revenue bases, population densities, incomes per capita, and the
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level and quality ofpublic services. However, we also observe varations in tax effort between
councils that apparently have fairly similar socio-economic characteristics, such as Kibaha
DC and Kilosa DC.7 How do we explain these observations?
We wil use the experiences with the head tax, locally named 'development levy', as our
frame of reference. Development levy is the single most important local governent tax base
in Tanania. In 1997, for an average of 42 distrct councils development levy generated about
30 percent of the total reported local revenues. The levy is, in principle, levied on every
person above the age of 18 years and ordinarily a resident in the area. Women are exempted
in most councils. In district councils the tax is in generallevied on a flat basis. In contrast to
most other local tax bases that are based on agrcultural outputs and, thus, may fluctuate
according to annual rainfall (e.g., market fees and crop cesses), development levy is In
principle a fairly stable revenue base. Therefore, it is an attractive tax base for local
authorities.
The ratio between development levy revenues reported to the distrct treasury and projected
revenues (based on population statistics) differs significantly between the two councils. For
instance, in 1996 the collection ratio, referrng to revenues collected in per cent of the
estimated tax potential, was 26.7 per cent in Kibaha DC, compared to 45.6 per cent in Kilosa.
Thus, although the statutory tax rate per head was the same in the two councils in 1996 (TSh
1,000), the effective rate, measured as revenues per eligible taxpayer, was more than 60
percent higher in Kilosa compared to Kibaha (table 1).









7 According to World Bank (1993:29) the povert profies in Coastal Region (including Kibaha De) and
Morogoro Region (including Kilosa De) are fairly simi1ar. This observation is based on a comparson of faring
environments in different regions, since agriculture is the main economic activity in rual areas.
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3. Coercion
How do we explain the different tax collection ratios between the councils? We suggest the
following proposition:
ProlJosition l:
Diferences in tax effort between local authorities are due to variations in the degree of
coercion involved in tax enforcement.
The evidence supporting this proposition emphasises the importance of different tax
enforcement regimes, and, thus, the relationship between the state apparatus and the citizens.
Analytically, the relationship between a taxpayer and the (local) governent contains at least
two elements (Cowell, 1990; Levi, 1988):
. The coercive element.
This refers to the bureaucratic apparatus that the local authority deploys to collect revenues. It
is represented by the enforcement activities of collectors and the penalties imposed on those
detected for non-compliance, i.e., the organisational effort.
. The element of fiscal exchange.
This has to do with reciprocity, i.e., how far citizens are obtaining some reciprocal services in
retum for their tax contributions. Thus, taxation and the provision of public goods and
services may be interpreted as a contractual re1ationship between taxpayers and the (local)
governent.
It should be noted that there is always a coercive element in taxation (Andreoni et aL., 1998).
However, to minimisethe costs of enforcement and to maximise the output that can be taxed,
the governent has to create some kind of voluntary compliance.8 First, the governent must
create confidence in its ability and its capacity to deliver promised retums for taxes. Second,
to reduce the problems of free-riding it must co-ordinate the actions of taxpayers so that each
perceives others paying their share (Levi, 1988:53).
8 Levi (1988) uses the concept 'quasi-voluntary compliance'. It is 'voluntar' because taxpayers choose to pay. It
is 'quasi-voluntar' because the non-compliant are subject to coercion - ifthey are caught. Thus, quasi-voluntary
compliance is one aspect of what is generally labelled legitimacy.
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Most taxpayers are of course not able to assess the exact value of what they receive in retum
from the governent for taxes paid. However, it can be argued that the taxpayer has general
impressions and attitudes conceming ms own and others' terms of trade with the governent.
If this is the case, then it is reasonable to assume that a taxpayer's behaviour is affected by his
satisfaction or lack of satisfaction with his terms of trade with the governent. Thus, if the
system oftaxes is perceived to be unjust, tax resistance may, at least parly, be considered as
an attempt by the taxpayer to adjust ms terms of trade with the governent. 9
Taxpayers in local authorities in Tanzania see few tangible benefits in retum for the taxes they
pay. Virtally no deve10pment activities are undertaken through councils' financial
sponsorship, and even the existing capacities are not producing the expected services due to
lack of operation and maintenance funds (Semboja and Therkildsen, 1992, 1995). The
deterioration and in some cases non-existence of public services raises taxpayers perceptions
of exploitation from an unequal contract with governent, and promotes tax resistance.1O
Taxpayers' perceptions of the quality ofpublic servces in Kilosa and Kibaha are presented in
table 2. Dissatisfaction seems to be most widespread in Kilosa where 75 percent of the
respondents considered the quality to be bad (compared to 66 percent in Kibaha). None of the
respondents in Kilosa considered the public services to be good (compared to 6 percent in
Kibaha). 77 percent of the respondents in Kilosa said the quality of the services today was
worse thanthree years ago (the corresponding figure for Kibaha was 66 percent).
Table 2 Perceptions on the quality o/public services












9 Scott (1985) argues that one of the most importt 'weapons of the weak' is the ability to withdraw
compliance. Ths can take a passive form, such as shirking, or an active form, such as rebellon. Historically,
unwilingness of the population to comp1y with a tax that is deemed unjust has been a cata1yst for political
action. The Boston tea part and the Thatcher poll tax are ilustrative examples. Bates (1983) provides some
examp1es from Afrca.io Enemu (2000:181) reviewing the problems and prospects of 10ca1 govemance in Africa supports this
argument.
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Furthermore, 83 percent of the respondents in Kibaha DC answered that in their view taxes
was 'only partly' or 'not at all' used to provide public services. The corresponding figue for
Kilosa was 88 percent (the majority, Le., 70 percent, answered 'not at all'). Taxpayers'
perceptions were supported by the tax collectors interviewed.
Widespread tax resistance is observed in the studyareas. People may take to the extreme to
evade taxes, for instance, by literally hiding in the bush when tax collectors are approaching.
In particular, the revenue administration in Kilosa DC relies heavily on simple physical
coercion to obtain the resources they need from their subjects and to ensure compliance.
Roadblocks, manned by the local militia or police, are frequently us ed as tools of tax
enforcement. Taxpayers reciprocate sometimes in the form of violent 'counter-atlacks' on
collectors, bumingtax offices, etc.. In 1996, for instance, the ward office in Chanru was
destroyed during night and the Tax Register Books were bumt. Tax collectors avoided certain
vilages in Kilosa due to the high personal risk involved in tax collection. Other vilages were
only visited by collectors accompanied by the local militia.11 In contrast, tax collection in
Kibaha is characterised with more laxity.
The argument that tax resistance is correlated to deteriorating public services is supported by
other studies. Bukurura (1991:91) refers to an investigation from 1987 by the Tanzania News
Agency in Kigoma Town Council, which reported that 'many people were defaulting
apparently because they thought the council was not doing its best to serve the residents'.
Tripp (1997:154) describes non-payment ofdevelopment levy as a form ofpopular opposition
towards state policies. She argues (p. 8) that tax evasion may be understood as one of many
forms of 'quiet strategi es of resistance in the form of economic non-compliance'.
Thus, in circumstances where taxes are perceived to be unfair and people receive few tangible
benefits in retum from taxes paid, we wil expect that only coercive methods of tax
enforcement wil generate tax revenues. The reciprocity or contractual relationship between
taxpayers and the local governent is absent.
11 Cases of tax revolts are aIso reported from councils in other regions, including Kilimanjaro Region and
Coastal Region. Daily News (28 November, 1997:5) reports that '(o)ver twenty Moshi Municipal Council
workers who were on a special operation to net development levy defaulters were attcked by a mob at Mbuyuni
Market on Wednesday afternoon and eight ofthem were injured, some seriously ..'.
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4. The institutional set-up for tax collection
Why do the tax enforcement regimes differ between the two councils leading to substantial
differences in the use of coercion? We suggest the following proposition:
Proposition 2:
Coercive tax enforcement is facilitated when the 'bargaining powers' with respect to tax
collection are in the favour of the council administration, and the elected councilors have no
direct injluence on collection.
The arguments and observations supporting this proposition focus on the stakeholders
involved in tax collection, and their relative bargaining power. Local governent tax
collection is basically a council's staff affair and completely separated from the central
governent revenue authority (i.e., the Tanzania Revenue Authority). In district councils it is
organised around three levels, name1y the council headquarters, the ward and the vilage
leveIs. At the sub-vilage level, the kitongoji leader is responsible for mobilising taxpayers.12
At the district headquarters the responsibility rests with the council treasury, headed by the
District Treasurer (DT). At the ward leve1 the responsibility for tax collection rests with the
office ofthe Ward Executive Officer (WEO). The WEO also handles deve10pmental and law
and order functions at that level. For this purpose the local militia are to their disposal. In
larger wards which may possess greater revenue potential there wil also be a ward revenue
collector (WRC) to spearhead revenue collection in the ward. At the vilage leve1, the
responsibility rests with the office of the vilage executive officer (VEO). The VEO is also
responsible for vilage developmental issues. The vilage executive officers are nominated to
their position by the vilage governents, but appointed and employed by the district counciL.
The system of nomination ensures that the VEO has to come from the vilages. At the sub-
vilage level the kitongoji leader assists in mobilising taxpayers.
This institutional set-up is characterised by at least three principals: (i) the administrative
leadership (management team) of the local authority, (ii) local politicians and (iii) the central
governent administration (i.e., Ministry of Local Governent). These stakeholders,
12 Distrct and urban councils are sub-divided into wards (kata). Curently there are about 2,400 wards in
Tanzania, and more than 9,000 registered vilages. Each vilage is supposed to have at least 250 households
(kayas). Vilages are sub-divided into vitongoji. On average there are about 3 vitongoji per vilage.
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sometimes independent of each other and sometimes through collusion tr to influence the
revenue target and, thus, the actions of the tax collectors. Based on evidence from fieldwork,
we present the following propOSitiOllS about the stakeholders' objectives:
(i) The objective of the management of the loeal authority (the administrative
leadership) is to generate enough tax revenues to pay the wage bil and allowances of the
staff. This target seems to be a minimum performance requirement from the central
governent. 13 This argument is supported by observations from Kibaha and Kilosa. The
performance of tax collectors at the ward and vilage levels is related to their capability to
collect enough revenues to cover their wage bils. In recent years, several vilage executive
officers (VEOs) and some ward revenue collectors (WRC) have been fired due to poor
perfonnance.
However, since both revenue estimates and reports on revenue collection are based on
information from the administrative staff, there is room for manufacturing numbers. These
observations are consistent with Migdal's (1988:253) argument that political systems under
pressure from the centre to produce certain development results are likely to exercise their own
form of accommodation. The most common form is simply to pass false or inflated accounts of
development results to superiors who are out of touch with local conditions. Thus, where
supervision is lax, distrct leaders, inc1uding local bureaucrats, may use their budgetar discretion
and the force at their disposal for personal gain.
(ii) One important objective of local politicians is to get re-elected (and thereby also to
achieve sitting allowances when participating in council meetings). Politicians may say they
want an effcient tax administration, - but only to the point at which voters begin complaining
that they are being harassed. Councilors are, in general, re1uctant to raise local taxes and
charges, not only due to concems about their popularity, but also because they may be major
local landowners or businesspeople who consider higher taxes as having direct negative
impact on them. As aresult councilors try to intervene in revenue collection.
13 In the book 'Africans. The history of a continent John Ilffe (1995:196) discusses the priorities of the colonial
administration. Re quotes a veteran native commissioner in Southern Rhodesia who remembered his duties as
follows: 'Get to know your district, and your people. Keep an eye on them, collect tax if possible, but for Gods
sake don't worr headquarters.' To some extent Ilffe's description from the colonial period reflects the present
district official's approach in Tanania: Don't worr headquarers, Le., the central governent. To achieve this it
is necessary tocollect enough revenues to pay the salaries of the 10cal employees, otherwise complaints wil be
forwarded though the trade unions.
9
Indications on the impacts of political intervention in tax collection can be found in the councils'
financial statements. For instance, many councils experience revenue shortfalls in election years,
paricularly with respect to development levy. In a sample of 48 councils, 31 experienced a
drop in revenues in the election year 1995.14 This might be due to the influence ofpoliticians
(inc1uding local and. central governent politicians). In both Kibaha and Kilosa we were
informed that CCM-politicians (the ruling par) tred to moderate the tax collectors' efforts to
enforce taxes durng election years by issuing statements such as 'don't harass taxpayers' or
'relax on tax collection'. Politicians from the opposition paries, in contrast, approached
taxpayers directly and advised them 'not to pay taxes', since taxes, according to their view, were
used to 'finance the CCM-governent'. Such statements are said to be common during election
years.
(iii) The objective of the central government administration (i.e., the Ministr of Regional
Administration and Local Governent) is vague with respect to taxation. However, a tax
system is also a mechanism ofpolitical control. According to Moore (1998:105), it comprises
two main elements: (1) the sets of information on citizens that a governent otherwise might
not collect and maintain; and (2) a network of public collection agents who use this
information, and become 'repositories of knowledge' about what is going on in remote areas
where the state elites have little direct influence and knowledge. Thus, the revenue.itselfmay
not be the most valuable product of tax enforcement. But active revenue raising may be an
important means of keeping a state machinery alive and active at the 10calleveL. An indicator
us ed by the central leve! to as sure that this machinery is alive, is that the local authority
generates sufficient revenues to cover its wage bil.
By and large, however, the central governent is not much directly involved in mattersof
local governent taxation. For instance, the tax by-law system gives local authorities in
Tanzania quite a wide discretion to introduce new local taxes and to set tax rates, subject to
ministerial approval. Due to lack of capacity and poor co-ordination between the central and
local governent only limited restrictions are in practice imposed by the centrallevel on local
governents' tax design. Therefore, the local revenue systems have developed without much
interference from the centralleveL. 15
14 Based on data from the Ministr of Regional Administration and Local Governent.
15 Laek of eo-ordination between the central and loeal levels has led to duplieation of taes and inconsisteneies
between taxes imposed by 10eal authorities and the national governents development polieies (e.g., with
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Social networks further complicate the picture outlined above. Such networks may play
important roles on how tax enforcement is carred out in practice. In societies where family-,
tribal- and ethnical relations are strong and important, it is expected that civil servants provide
services to these. Tax collectors at the vilage level are, as mentioned above, recruited from
the vilages. Traditional networks may thus impose heavy constraints on the collector's
actions, inc1uding who is targeted to paying taxes and who is to be exempted.
In our survey we found, for instance, that taxpayers who had migrated to the studyareas from
other regions in Tanzana were more compliant than people who were bom in the area.
Migrants seerned (not surprisingly) to be less integrated and had looser relations to local
authorities, inc1uding tax collectors, compared to people bom in the area. Furthermore, we
found that migrants, in general, were relative1y more wealthy than people from the area. Thus,
we would expect that it is easier and probably more convenient for the tax collector at the
vilage leve1 (i.e., the Vilage Executive Officer), who lives in the vil age and is nominated to
his position by the Vil age Council, to target migrants rather than people from the area who
might be his relatives, neighbours or who are related to local politicians and authorities.
In contrast to the ambiguous motivations of the vilage level collectors, tax collectors at the
ward and district levels seem to be driven by motivations to maximise revenues. Thus, tax
collectors can report sufficient revenues that cover the wage bil and pocket whatever is left,
with or without collusion with their superiors.16 The larger the amount collected, the larger the
amount that can supplement their own meagre salaries.
To summanse, the vanous stakeholders involved in tax enforcement have divergent
objectives with respect to tax collection. In particular, political pressure seems to be a major
impediment to revenue collection. Political intervention sometimes results in conflicts
between the revenue administration and local politicians. For instance, a general view
respect to export promotion). An ilustrative example is the cess rate on cashew nuts, a major export crop, which
in 1997 represented 20 percent of the price paid to producers in Kibaha DC, creating huge disincentives for
export production. In border areas, smuggling has become extensive due to relatively high 10cal cess rates on
some crops, for instance on coffee. Thus, peasants dodge and manoeuvre to avoid the deprivation inflicted upon
them by public policy.
16 Corrption is often embedded in the hierarchical strcture of the bureaucracy (Rose-Ackerman, 1999:49).
Low-levels offcials collect bribes and pass a share to those at higher leveIs. Conversely, higher-ups may
organise and rationalise the corrpt system to avoid wasteful competition between lower leveIs. This system has
some similarities with sharecropping systems in agriculture. Sharecropping is a land-tenure system where the
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expressed by the tax administration in our study was that elected councilors obstrcted tax
collection and were talking 'cheap politics'. Such conflicts seem to be rooted parly in
divergent objectives with respect to tax enforcement, and partly in lack of trust between
administrators and politicians at the local leveL. Based on data from 14 district councils
Jacobsen (1999) finds that there is a 'trust deficit' in the political-administrative relations at
the locallevel in Tanzania. Furthemiore, lack of trust seems to reduce the flow of information
between politicians and bureaucrats.17
The conflict between the tax administration, including collectors, and local politicians is
particularly evident in Kilosa De. Local politicians have little influence on the tax enforceient
process. Collection is facilitated though extortive and violent approaches that are mainy
advocated and impleiented by council administrators, with minimum support from local
politicians. Thus, in the absence of democratic forms of accountabilty, tax collection in Kilosa
has tued into a licence for collectors on-the-ground to more or less freely augment the local
treasury and supplement their own salaries through extortion from local residents.18
Thus, in accordance with Mamdani's (1996:59) notion of 'decentralised despotism', financial
autonomy has provided the framework in which lower-level officials resort to extra-legal
enforceÌnent and violence to extort money from the population. 1bs arguent can be ilustrated
by a few examples. For instance, the statutory volunta period for paying development levy in
Tanania is from 1 January up to September 30. All tax payments made after the deadline are
subject to a penalty equivalent to 50 percent of the tax rate. As from October 1 to December
31 development levy payment 'campaigns' are conducted, organised by the ward office and
using state organs, such as the local militia and judiciar, to ensure compliance. Defaulters
may be visited in their homes, or people may be required to show their tax receipts at
roadblocks. Non-compliers who are caught are brought to cour at the primary court or ward
leveL. Due to widespread resistance, tax campaigns for development levy in Kilosa De
(involving the militia) start as early as in July, i.e., three months before the voluntar (and
statutory) payment period expired. The district treasury staff argued that by waiting to the end
land10rd gets a (percentage) share of agricu1tura1 output, and the tenant keeps the remaining output(Sah and
Stig1itz, 1992).
17 Conflcts between council emp10yees and 10ca1 politicians are, however, not a new phenomenon in Tanzania.
Dryden (1968: 144-149), referring to the mid-1960s, describes some areas of conflict between these stakeho1ders.
18 Wunsch (1990:54) based on Hyden (1983) argues that in circumstances where national leaders were dogmatic
on implementing comprehensive programes, as Tanzanian leaders were durg the late 1970s regarding
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of September, taxpayers' would have spent their money and nothing would be left for
taxation.
Furenore, in Kilosa the vilage level has been excluded from collection, and tax enforcement
has been taken over by the ward level. According to the distrct treasury staff, this was. due to
incentive problems connected with tax collection at the vilage level. One problem arises from
the presence of two principals for the Vilage Executive Officers (VEOs), i.e., the vilage
governent as the nominating authority and the council as the appointing and employing
authority, leading to divided loyalty. Another problem arises from VEOs operating within
their areas of domicile. Lack of arm's-length-relationship between tax collectors and
taxpayers introduces economics of affection into vill age tax collection. In many villages the
kitongoji leaders also resist in mobilising people to pay taxes due to theunpopularty oftaxation.
In Kibaha De, too, tensions between the administration and councilors are observed,
although much less pronounced than in Kilosa. In general, tax collection in Kibaha is
characterised with more laxity compared to Kilosa due to the intervention of politicians. In
some wards in Kibaha local politicians partly act as executives. A general view expressed by
the tax collecting staff, reflecting their frstration on this intervention, was that councilors
obstrcted tax collection. The expected consequence of this intervention is reduced tax effort.
Thus, this simple analysis suggests that tax effort depends on the relative 'bargaining power'
between the elected councilors and the management of the counciL.
5. Donors
Why do the relative influence of the council administration and local politicians on tax
enforcement vary between councils? We suggest the following proposition to explain these
observed differences:
ProlJosition 3:
Donor presenee empowers the manageriallevel in loeal authorities at the expense of elected
councilors.
Ujamaa vilagisation, bureaucrats have been reduced to authoritarIan and coereive instrments of enforcing
compliance.
13
Though distrct development programes donors often exert strong influence on the
behaviours,decisions and actions of local authorities' adminstrators and politicians. Generally,
donors co-operate with council administrators and staff to implement their activities, usually
though the creation of paralleI strctures. Ths intervention increases the influence and power of
the bureaucracy, at the expense ofthe political system.19 In Kilosa DistrctCouncil, which has a
long history of donor support, we found indications that this was indeed the case.20
Since donors, as noted above, increasingly use revenue generation as an indicator of the
performance of the councils they are involved in, ths may fuher empower the management
leve1.21 One strategy donors have used to reduce the problems of free riding by local councils
has been to adopt a matching scheme, which supplies aid only on the basis of matching funds
from the local governent. According to Catterson and Lindahl (1998:20), this has 'created
strong incentives for revenue collection' in Tanzania. Furthermore, donor support may cushion
council administrators against possible taxpayers' opposition. Servce provision through donor
supported activities provides a free riding opportnity to council adminstrators who often claim
to be the providers of such services. 22
Kibaha, in contrast, has experienced limited donor support. As noted above, local politicians
there play an important role in tax enforcement, and tax collection is characterised with more
laxity compared to Kilosa. The leve! of corrption (both absolute and relative) also seems to be
lower in Kibaha compared to Kilosa. This might be because local politicians in Kibaha to some
extent carr outinformal monitoring of the collectors. In general, the formal monitoring and
auditing devices do not function (or even exist) at the locallevel in Tanania.
19 This argument is supported by other studies. In a comprehensive study on the role of governent in adjusting
economies, Batley (1999) reports that public sector reformprogrammes pushed by donors and emphasising
technocratic solutions, lead to increased managerial power without a strengthening of the accountability of the
managers to politicians and the public.20 The Irish funded 'Kilosa Distrct Rural Development Programme' (KRDP) was initiated in 1979. In 1994 it
was one of the largest distrct development programmes in Tanzania (Mullen et a1., 1995).
21 Changes in the performanee of decentralised institutions have tended to be studied pricipally in terms of
financial performanee or revenue mobilisation (Crook and Manor, 1998:8). For instance, in a study explorig the
detenninants of success in Afrcan local governents, Smoke and Olowu (1992) define success mainly in terms
of fiscal performance.
22 However, people in Kilosa seem to be well aware about who is providing the various services, and distinguish
between 'council services' and 'donor provided services'. For instance, the main lOads in Kilosa which have a
fairly good standard due to donor funding, are 10cally referred to as 'Irish lOads', while the almost non-passable
feeder lOads are named 'council lOads' .
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6. Concluding remarks
This paper has explored the reasons why revenue-raising performance may differ between
local authorities in Tanzania. The analysis shows that coercion is likely to be an integral par
of the tax collection methods.Furthermore, the study shows that the involvement of donors at
the 10calleve1 may have at least two impacts on tax enforcement: (i) Donors' presence may
induce increased tax effort, however, (ii) at the expense of accountability and democratic
consolidation.
Thus, Moore's (1998) proposition that the more a state (in this case a local governent)
'eams' its income through bureaucratic tax collection, the more likely is the state-society
characterised by accountability and democracy, is not supported. In contrast, we tind that
increased tax effort is achieved through coercive methods often characterised by violent forms
of enforcement. The reciprocal element between the state and citizens seems to be absent in
connection with local governent taxation in Tanzania.
However, the analysis supports Moore's argument that donors, by the means they use to
prornote deve1opment, may undermine democracy and good govemance. For instance,
matching arrangements which supplies development aid on the basis of matching funds from
the local governent may lead to increased extortion by empowering the administration at the
expense of theelected councilors. Harsh tax enforcement in situations with poor service
delivery may thus contribute to further undermining the legitimacy of the governent and
increase tax resistance.
The results presented in this paper emphasise the importance of knowing how local
governent institutions work as a prerequisite to make good policy decisions. In certain
contexts extemal interventions may have impacts that are contrary to those intended. Such
interventions may contribute to undermine the legitimacy of the local governent and hamp er
democratic development by dis-empowering the political organs oflocal authorities.
Furtermore, the emphasis on revenue targets does not seem to acknowledge other major
impacts of the tax system. Many local revenue bases in Tanzania perform poorly with respect
to the basic principles of taxation: They are often distortionary and costly to administrate, and
deteriorate both horizontal and vertical equity. Attempts to squeeze additional revenues from
is
poorly designed taxes may, therefore, have negative effects on the economy and society in
general. However, these issues do not appear to be recognised neither by local authorities nor
donors whose main concem simply seems to be to increase tax revenues - at any costs.
The paper provides us with some directions for further research. In particular, there is a need
for more research on (i) the impacts of deve10pment aid on revenue collection, and (ii)
processes of democratisation. Firstly, the role of donors in relation to tax systems in poor aid
dependent countries is a fairly unexplored area of research. Through district deve10pment
programes donors have often exerted strong influence on the behaviours, decisions and actions
of 10ca1 authorities' administrators and politicians. A comparative study of tax collection in
councils with varying degrees of donor support may shed light on this and other issues, inc1uding
the possible impacts on revenue generation of the ongoing democratisation process. Secondly,
many issues of accountability are unexplored. For instance, are citizens in poor countres
likely to be able to hold bureaucrats (and politicians) accountable? In improving our
understanding of tax compliance behaviour in deve10ping countries, there is also a need for more
thorough examination of the apparently important concept of fairness in the exchange between
taxpayers and the governent.
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